Can Employers Require Personal Attendants to Work Seven Consecutive Days?

The Issue:

Can an employer require or allow a personal attendant (under Wage Order 15) and a Domestic Worker (under the Domestic Worker’s Bill of Rights, Labor Code sections 1450-1455) to work seven (7) consecutive days in a week, and if so, what is the rate of pay?

Short Answer:

The Domestic Worker’s Bill of Rights (“DWBR”), which applies here to caregivers/personal attendants (hereafter, “personal attendants”), only specifically requires that a personal attendant be paid one half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked more than 45 hours in the workweek. The definitions section of Wage Order 15 applies to personal attendants. (Wage Order 15(1)(B) – “Except as provided in sections 1, 2, 4, 10, and 15, the provisions of this order shall not apply to personal attendants . . .”.)  “Workweek” is defined in Wage Order 15(2) as “seven consecutive days, starting with the same calendar day each week. ‘Workweek’ is a fixed and regularly recurring period of 168 hours, seven (7) consecutive 24-hour periods.” (Wage Order 15(2)(R).)

Thus, as long as the personal attendant (who also is a Domestic Worker under the DWBR) is being paid time and a half for the hours worked over 45 hours in a seven-day period, the personal attendant can work 7 consecutive days.  There is no specific prohibition under Wage Order 15 or the DWBR that a personal attendant (again, under Wage Order 15 and the DWBR) cannot work 7 consecutive days.   

To err on the side of caution, however, in light of the general provisions of Labor Code section 551 referenced below, it may be prudent to provide the personal attendant with one day of rest for each 7-day workweek within a calendar month (totaling 4 days of rest per calendar month).

Although not necessary for personal attendants, the employer could (erring on the side of caution, if the personal attendant is working too many days without a day off) pay the employee double her regular rate for the 7th day (but most likely not applicable because of the DWBR). (Compare Wage Order 15(3)(B) with Labor Code section 1454.)

Sources (and Comments):

Labor Code § 1454 - A domestic work employee who is a personal attendant shall not be employed more than nine hours in any workday or more than 45 hours in any workweek unless the employee receives one and one-half times the employee’s regular rate of pay for all hours worked over nine hours in any workday and for all hours worked more than 45 hours in the workweek.

That’s it; no other requirement.

Some may want to look to the follow Wage Order 15 section and pay double time for the 6th and 7th day but section 3 (in Wage Order 15) does not specifically apply to personal attendants (see Definitions in Wage Order 15 Section 1(b) and Section 2(J)):

Wage Order 15(3)  -

(B) No LIVE-IN employee  shall  be  required  to  work  more  than  five  (5)  days  in  any  one  workweek  without  a day off of not less than 24 consecutive hours  except in  an  emergency  as  defined  in  subsection  2(D) [“Emergency” means an unpredictable or unavoidable occurrence at unscheduled intervals requiring immediate action],  provided  that the employee is compensated for time worked in  excess  of  five  (5)  workdays  in   any   workweek   at   one   and one-half (11/2) times the employee’s regular rate of pay for hours worked up to and including nine (9) hours. Time worked in excess of nine (9) hours on the sixth (6th) and seventh (7th) workdays shall be compensated at double the employee’s regular rate of pay.

(E) An employee may be employed on seven (7) workdays in one workweek with no overtime pay required when the total hours of employment during such workweek do not exceed thirty (30) and the total hours of employment in any one workday thereof do not exceed six (6).

(F) The provisions of Labor Code Sections 551 and 552 regarding one (1) day’s rest in seven (7) shall not be construed to prevent an accumulation of days of rest when the nature of the employment reasonably requires the employee to work seven (7) or more consecutive days; provided, however, that in each calendar month, the employee shall receive the equivalent of one (1) day’s rest in seven (7).

 Again, double time is not necessary for personal attendants (meeting that definition in Wage Order 15 and as a Domestic Worker), just time and half.

The following are some general labor code sections.  No specific code or case yet applies these to personal attendants, but it may be prudent to follow the code sections (for a one day in seven rest, but, as mentioned below, they can be cumulated during the month):

Labor Code § 551 – “Every person employed in any occupation of labor is entitled to one day's rest therefrom in seven.”

• Under the Labor Code, a day of rest is guaranteed for each workweek, not for any consecutive seven-day period. Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2017) 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 889, 393 P.3d 375, answer to certified question conformed to 865 F.3d 1261.

 Labor Code § 552 – “No employer of labor shall cause his employees to work more than six days in seven.”

Comments:

• Under the Labor Code provision stating that an employer may not “cause his employees to work more than six days in seven,” the term “cause” means that an employer's obligation is to apprise employees of their entitlement to a day of rest and thereafter to maintain absolute neutrality as to the exercise of that right, and that an employer may not conceal the entitlement to rest or encourage its employees to forgo rest other than by paying overtime, but the employer is not liable simply because an employee chooses to work a seventh day. Mendoza v. Nordstrom, Inc. (2017) 216 Cal.Rptr.3d 889, 393 P.3d 375, answer to certified question conformed to 865 F.3d 1261

• But the one day off can be measured over a 30-day period (a calendar month), so could be stacked at the end: e.g., last 4 days are off.  In other words, in a calendar month, the employee must receive the equivalent of one (1) day’s rest in seven (7), or 4 days.

 Authored by Attorney Babin

DISCLAIMER

This entry does not give specific legal advice about your specific legal problem. No text or graphic contained in this entry is to be or should be used or relied upon as legal advice. This entry does not create an attorney-client relationship. If you want specific legal advice about your particular legal issues, or if you want to create an attorney-client relationship, you need to retain the Law Offices of Ron A. Stormoen by a signed written retainer agreement.

Timely Payment of Wages After Employee Resignation to Avoid Penalties

Question:
What are the penalties for failing to pay wages timely when an employee quits?

Short Answer:
When an employee, not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case wages are due at the time of quitting. If wages are not paid timely, the employer may face penalties based on the employee's daily rate of pay, calculated by multiplying the daily wage by the number of days the employee remains unpaid, up to a maximum of 30 days.

Legal Authority:

California Labor Code Section 202(a) provides:

“If an employee not having a written contract for a definite period quits his or her employment, his or her wages shall become due and payable not later than 72 hours thereafter, unless the employee has given 72 hours previous notice of his or her intention to quit, in which case the employee is entitled to his or her wages at the time of quitting. Notwithstanding any other law, an employee who quits without providing a 72-hour notice shall be entitled to receive payment by mail if he or she so requests and designates a mailing address. The date of the mailing shall constitute the date of payment for purposes of the requirement to provide payment within 72 hours of the notice of quitting.”

California Labor Code Section 203(a) provides:

“If an employer willfully fails to pay, without abatement or reduction, in accordance with Sections 201, 201.3, 201.5, 201.6, 201.8, 201.9, 202, and 205.5, any wages of an employee who is discharged or who quits, the wages of the employee shall continue as a penalty from the due date thereof at the same rate until paid or until an action therefor is commenced; but the wages shall not continue for more than 30 days. An employee who secretes or absents themselves to avoid payment to them, or who refuses to receive the payment when fully tendered to them, including any penalty then accrued under this section, is not entitled to any benefit under this section for the time during which the employee so avoids payment.”

Conclusion

Failing to pay final wages promptly when an employee quits can result in significant financial penalties for employers. Adhering to the timelines set forth in Labor Code Sections 202 and 203 are crucial to maintaining compliance and avoiding unnecessary disputes. Employers should implement procedures to ensure final wages are processed accurately and within the required timeframes, regardless of whether an employee provides advance notice of their resignation.

DISCLAIMER

This entry does not give specific legal advice about your specific legal problem. No text or graphic contained in this entry is to be or should be used or relied upon as legal advice. This entry does not create an attorney-client relationship. If you want specific legal advice about your particular legal issues, or if you want to create an attorney-client relationship, you need to retain the Law Offices of Ron A. Stormoen by a signed written retainer agreement. 

When Does the Delayed Discovery Rule Apply, and When Does It Not Apply?

The Delayed Discovery Rule allows plaintiffs to file a lawsuit after the standard statute of limitations has expired if they could not reasonably have discovered the cause of action earlier. However, this rule does not give plaintiffs a free pass to sit back, ignore potential signs of wrongdoing, and delay investigating potential wrongs. Plaintiffs are required to act diligently and cannot wait for facts to come to them once they have reasonable suspicions of wrongdoing. Once you have reason to believe something is wrong, you must look into it promptly.

Duty to Investigate Wrongdoing

Under California law, the clock starts ticking on a statute of limitations when a plaintiff has reason to suspect that they have been wronged or injured.  

Discovery of a cause of action occurs when the claimant “ ‘has reason ... to suspect a factual basis’ for the action.” (Pooshs v. Philip Morris USA, Inc. (2011) 51 Cal.4th 788, 797.) In other words, “the statute of limitation begins to run ‘when the plaintiff has reason to suspect an injury and some wrongful cause ....’ ” (MGA Entertainment, Inc. v. Mattel, Inc. (2019) 41 Cal.App.5th 554, 561, citing Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc. (2005) 35 Cal.4th 797, 803.)

As the California Supreme Court held in Fox v. Ethicon Endo-Surgery, Inc., plaintiffs must show that, despite diligent efforts, they were unable to discover essential facts supporting their claim during the statutory period. The rule prevents plaintiffs from avoiding summary judgment if they "wait for the facts" instead of pursuing them once suspicions arise​.

In Fox, the plaintiff was allowed to amend her complaint after discovering during a deposition that a surgical stapler might have caused her complications. She had no prior reason to suspect the stapler's involvement and showed that she diligently tried to uncover the cause. However, the court emphasized that plaintiffs relying on the Delayed Discovery Rule must demonstrate that they were unable to discover the injury despite reasonable efforts. If they are aware of circumstances suggesting injury but fail to investigate, they cannot use the rule to extend the filing period​.

Similarly, in Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co., the court explained that plaintiffs must take action when they have a suspicion of wrongdoing. In Jolly, the plaintiff suspected that the drug DES caused her health problems but waited to sue, hoping for more definitive proof. The court ruled that once suspicion arises, plaintiffs must "find the facts" rather than waiting for conclusive evidence​.

When the Rule Applies

The Delayed Discovery Rule applies if you had no reasonable way of knowing about the injury or wrongdoing during the regular statute of limitations period. If you were unaware of the harm and could not have reasonably found out, then you may file a lawsuit later.

 Application of the Delayed Discovery Rule turns on whether Plaintiff herself could have discovered the information during the statute of limitations period. “Once the plaintiff has a suspicion of wrongdoing, and therefore an incentive to sue, she must decide whether to file suit or sit on her rights. So long as a suspicion exists, it is clear that the plaintiff must go find the facts; she cannot wait for the facts to find her.” (Jolly v. Eli Lilly & Co. (1988) 44 Cal.3d 1103, 1111, emphasis added.)

When the Rule Does NOT Apply

The rule does not apply if you have reason to suspect something is wrong but do nothing about it. For example, in one case (not a published case), the plaintiff noticed suspicious circumstances like changed locks and missing documents but waited years to take action. The court found that the plaintiff should have investigated these signs of wrongdoing, and therefore, the Delayed Discovery Rule did not apply.

Failure to Act on Suspicion

You cannot claim the Delayed Discovery Rule if you have reasonable suspicions of wrongdoing and fail to act. Courts have consistently ruled that you must investigate once you have any reason to suspect harm. In Norgart v. Upjohn Co., the court held that if you think someone might have done something wrong, you need to investigate, not wait for proof​.

Plaintiffs cannot invoke the Delayed Discovery Rule if they had reasonable suspicions and failed to act. The courts have ruled that it is not sufficient for plaintiffs to "wait for the facts." Instead, plaintiffs must investigate potential wrongdoing diligently. If they fail to do so, the statute of limitations is not tolled.

In Norgart v. Upjohn Co., the court highlighted that suspicion of wrongdoing triggers the duty to investigate. If plaintiffs are aware of circumstances that suggest an injury, they cannot delay their investigation, hoping the facts will find them. This principle was reinforced in Jolly, where the court emphasized that waiting for conclusive proof is insufficient to delay the statute of limitations​.

In that case, the California Supreme Court held that there was no triable issue of material fact and the defendant pharmaceutical company was entitled to judgment as a matter of law based upon the statute of limitations where a plaintiff admitted, on more than one occasion, having suspected that someone had done something wrong to cause his daughter's death by suicide. (Norgart v. Upjohn Co., supra, 21 Cal.4th at pp. 405-406.)

Conclusion

The Delayed Discovery Rule applies only when a plaintiff is unaware of the harm and could not have reasonably discovered it earlier. However, once a plaintiff has information that would lead a reasonable person to investigate, they are legally obligated to do so. If they fail to investigate despite having reasonable suspicions of wrongdoing, they cannot use the Delayed Discovery Rule to extend the statute of limitations.

DISCLAIMER

This entry does not give specific legal advice about your specific legal problem. No text or graphic contained in this entry is to be or should be used or relied upon as legal advice. This entry does not create an attorney-client relationship. If you want specific legal advice about your particular legal issues, or if you want to create an attorney-client relationship, you need to retain the Law Offices of Ron A. Stormoen by a signed written retainer agreement. 

LANDLORD – TENANT MAXIMUM SECURITY DEPOSIT IN CALIFORNIA THAT LANDLORDS CAN LEGALLY COLLECT

ISSUE: What is the maximum security deposit that California property owners can legally collect after July 1, 2024?

SHORT ANSWER:

For security deposits collected on or after July 1, 2024, the maximum security deposit for a dwelling unit is one month’s rent, regardless of whether the unit is furnished or unfurnished.

There is an exception if the property owner is (1) a natural person or limited liability corporation in which all members are natural persons AND (2) owns no more than two (2) residential properties, that collectively include no more than four (4) dwelling units offered for rent. If the landlord meets this criteria, the maximum security deposit may not exceed two months’ rent, regardless of whether the unit is furnished or unfurnished.

This exception does not apply, however, if the tenant is a service member. The maximum security deposit for service members remains at one month’s rent.

DISCUSSION:

California Assembly Bill 12 (AB 12) was passed by the State Legislature and signed by Governor Newsom on October 11, 2023.  AB 12 was enacted to amend, repeal, and add a section to California Civil Code 1950.5, which governs security deposits statewide.

Prior to July 1, 2024, California property owners had been allowed to collect a maximum security deposit of two months’ rent for unfurnished dwelling units and three months’ rent for furnished dwelling units. AB 12 amended this rule as detailed below.   

General Rule: Effective July 1, 2024

For all new leases signed on or after July 1, 2024, the maximum security deposit that California property owners are allowed to collect (in addition to the first month’s rent) is one month’s rent, regardless of whether the unit is furnished or unfurnished.  Because the change is not retroactive, leases executed before July 1, 2024 remain unaffected.

Civil Code section 1950.5, subdivision (c)(1), provides:

[A] landlord may not demand or receive security, however denominated, in an amount or value in excess of an amount equal to one month's rent, in addition to any rent for the first month paid on or before initial occupancy.

"Security," as defined in Civil Code section 1950.5, refers to any payment, fee, deposit, or charge—excluding application fees—required at the start of tenancy, whether as an advance payment of rent or to cover potential defaults, damages, or cleaning costs (for tenancies beginning on or after January 1, 2003) upon the lease's termination. (Civ. Code § 1950.5, subd. (b).)

It is important to note that the amendment to section 1950.5 did not change the rule stating that the security deposit ceiling includes all forms of deposits.  Thus, any security deposit, whether it is for pets, keys, or other purposes, must be included within the overall limits set by law.  The legislation does not provide for any separate or additional charges that would allow landlords to exceed the cap on security deposits.

Exception to the General Rule: Small Landlords

There is an exception to the one-month maximum security deposit for small landlords who meet specific criteria. Civil Code section 1950.5, subdivision (c)(4)(A), provides:

[A] landlord may not demand or receive security, however denominated, in an amount or value in excess of an amount equal to two months’ rent, in addition to any rent for the first month paid on or before the initial occupancy if the landlord meets both of the following requirements:

(i) The landlord is a natural person or a limited liability company in which all members are natural persons [AND]

(ii) The landlord owns no more than two residential rental properties that collectively include no more than four (4) dwelling units offered for rent.

For purposes of this paragraph, “natural person” includes any natural person who is a settlor or beneficiary of a family trust. “Family trust” means a revocable living trust or irrevocable trust in which the settlors and beneficiaries of the trust are persons who are related to each other as siblings, spouse, domestic partner, child, parent, grandparent, or grandchild. (Civ. Code § 1950.5, subd. (c)(4)(C).)

Thus, under this exception a landlord can charge a security deposit of up to two months' rent, plus the first month's rent, if and only if (1) they are an individual or part of an LLC made up of individuals and (2) they own no more than two rental properties with a total of four units or less.

Exception to the Exception: Service Members

The small landlord exception to the one-month rule does not apply, however, if the prospective tenant is a service member.  In other words, the security deposit limit for service members remains at one month’s rent (plus first month’s rent), regardless of whether the landlord meets the exception’s criteria.  In addition, a landlord may not refuse to rent a unit to a service member due to this restriction on security deposits. Civil Code section 1950.5, subdivision (c)(4)(B), provides, in pertinent part:

A landlord shall not refuse to enter into a rental agreement for residential property with a prospective tenant who is a service member because this subparagraph prohibits the landlord from demanding or receiving a greater amount of security than that which is established in [Civ. Code § 1950.5, subd. (c)(1)].

For purposes of this paragraph, a “service member” means all of the following:

(1) A member of the militia, as defined in Military and Veterans Code section 120, called or ordered into active state or federal service pursuant to Military and Veterans Code section 143 or 146 or federal law. 

(2) A member of an active or reserve component of the Armed Forces who is ordered into active duty pursuant to federal law.

(Cal. Mil. & Vet. Code, § 400.)

Additional Provisions Under Section 1950.5, subd. (c)

Under Civil Code section 1950.5, subdivision (c)(2), if a landlord collects rent in advance, the lease must be for a term of six months or longer and the advance payment cannot cover less than six months of rent. Section 1950.5, subdivision (c)(2), states:

This subdivision does not prohibit an advance payment of not less than six months’ rent if the term of the lease is six months or longer.

Finally, a landlord and tenant can agree to make changes to the property, like structural or decorative alterations, for a fee, as long as the changes are not related to cleaning or repairs that the landlord can already charge the previous tenant for. Specifically, Civil Code section 1950, subdivision (c)(3), provides:

This subdivision does not preclude a landlord and a tenant from entering into a mutual agreement for the landlord, at the request of the tenant and for a specified fee or charge, to make structural, decorative, furnishing, or other similar alterations, if the alterations are other than cleaning or repairing for which the landlord may charge the previous tenant as provided by subdivision (e).

The crux of the amendment is to increase protection for tenants by limiting the amount landlords can charge for security deposits, especially for low-income or subsidized housing tenants. The change aims to reduce financial barriers to housing and promote fairness in rental agreements. On the other hand, these regulations may impose additional burdens on landlords by limiting their ability to mitigate potential damages or non-payment risks. Overall, the changes reflect a balance between tenant protection and landlord rights, but the impact of the change may vary depending on the specific rental dynamics.

EXAMPLE

Maria is a small landlord in California who owns a duplex where she rents out both units. After July 1, 2024, Maria wants to rent out one of the units to a new tenant, John. The unit is unfurnished, and the monthly rent is $2,000.  

Under the new law, if Maria does not qualify for the small landlord exception, the maximum security deposit she can charge John is one month’s rent--$2,000. (Civ. Code § 1950.5, subd. (c)(1).)

However, Maria does qualify for the small landlord exception because:

(1) She is a natural person; and

(2) She owns no more than two (2) residential properties that collectively include no more than four (4) dwelling units.

Therefore, Maria can legally collect a security deposit of up to two months’ rent, which would be $4,000 in this case. (Civ. Code § 1950.5, subd. (c)(4)(A).)

But, if John is a service member, the small landlord exception does not apply. In that scenario, Maria can only collect a maximum security deposit of one month’s rent--$2,000—despite her qualification as a small landlord. (Civ. Code § 1950.5, subd. (c)(4)(B).)

Authored by Attorney Babin

DISCLAIMER

This entry does not give specific legal advice about your specific legal problem. No text or graphic contained in this entry is to be or should be used or relied upon as legal advice. This entry does not create an attorney-client relationship. If you want specific legal advice about your particular legal issues, or if you want to create an attorney-client relationship, you need to retain the Law Offices of Ron A. Stormoen by a signed written retainer agreement. 

EMPLOYER – EMPLOYEE MEAL TIME BREAKS AND PREMIUMS

ISSUE:  Is the Employer liable for a meal time premium if the non-exempt employee either fails to take a lunch or takes a late lunch?

SHORT ANSWER:  Yes, unless the Employer takes reasonable steps to ensure no work for employee during meal time breaks, and expressly encourages the timely meal time. 

This Article looks at what the Employer can do regarding meal times, so the Employer may not be liable to the Employee for the Employee not taking, or who is late in taking, meal times.  The following may not apply in the event of written waivers, or in certain industries (e.g., security guards, see Augustus v. ABM Sec. Servs., Inc. (2016) 2 Cal.5th 257.)

DISCUSSION:  Labor Code section 512 provides the meal time requirement for a non-exempt employee:

                (a) An employer shall not employ an employee for a work period of more than five hours per day without providing the employee with a meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total work period per day of the employee is no more than six hours, the meal period may be waived by mutual consent of both the employer and employee. An employer shall not employ an employee for a work period of more than 10 hours per day without providing the employee with a second meal period of not less than 30 minutes, except that if the total hours worked is no more than 12 hours, the second meal period may be waived by mutual consent of the employer and the employee only if the first meal period was not waived.

Labor Code section 226.7(c) provides the penalty for failure to provide a timely meal time:

                (c) If an employer fails to provide an employee a meal or rest or recovery period in accordance with a state law, including, but not limited to, an applicable statute or applicable regulation, standard, or order of the Industrial Welfare Commission, the Occupational Safety and Health Standards Board, or the Division of Occupational Safety and Health, the employer shall pay the employee one additional hour of pay at the employee's regular rate of compensation for each workday that the meal or rest or recovery period is not provided.

Regarding meal time, the California Department of Industrial Relations says this:

                “Q.  If there is bona fide relief from all duty during a meal period and the employer relinquishes all control over the employee’s activities, but the employee then freely chooses to continue working, is the employer liable for meal period premium pay?

                A.  No, the employer would not be liable for meal period premium pay where there is bona fide relief from duty and relinquishment of employer control (and no discouragement or coercion from the employer against taking the meal period).  However, in this circumstance, an employer that knows or has reason to know an employee is performing work during the meal period owes compensation to the employee for the time worked (including any overtime hours that have accrued as a result of working through the meal period).”  (See Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004.) (www.dir.ca.gov/dlse/faq_mealperiods.htm (Question 5)).

Further, the referenced California Supreme Court case provides the legal authority for the position set forth above:

                “To summarize: An employer's duty with respect to meal breaks under both section 512, subdivision (a) and Wage Order No. 5 is an obligation to provide a [timely] meal period to its employees. The employer satisfies this obligation if it relieves its employees of all duty, relinquishes control over their activities and permits them a reasonable opportunity to take an uninterrupted 30-minute break, and does not impede or discourage them from doing so. What will suffice may vary from industry to industry.”

                On the other hand, the employer is not obligated to police meal breaks and ensure no work thereafter is performed. Bona fide relief from duty and the relinquishing of control satisfies the employer's obligations, and work by a relieved employee during a meal break does not thereby place the employer in violation of its obligations and create liability for premium pay under Wage Order No. 5, subdivision 11(B) and Labor Code section 226.7, subdivision (b).”  (Emphasis added.)

(Brinker Restaurant Corp. v. Superior Court (2012) 53 Cal.4th 1004, 1040-1041) 

In other words, an Employer is not duty bound to police an Employee’s meal time. It is enough for the Employer to clearly make the meal time timely available, instruct the Employee to timely take the meal time and relieve the employee of duties. I would suggest also writing up the recalcitrant Employee who fails to abide by the meal time guidelines, so there is a record, and terminating if there is a pattern of ignoring company policy. 

That is it.  While no result can be guaranteed, if the Employee then takes a late lunch, or no lunch, with that protocol applied, there should be no premium or penalty owed. However, be careful, Employer: If the Employer knows or has reason to know an Employee is performing work during the meal period and continues to allow it, the Employer may owe compensation to the Employee for the time worked (including any overtime hours that have accrued as a result of working through the meal period). In other words, do not turn a blind eye to the Employee that does not abide by the rules. 

DISCLAIMER

This entry does not give specific legal advice about your specific legal problem. No text or graphic contained in this entry is to be or should be used or relied upon as legal advice. This entry does not create an attorney-client relationship. If you want specific legal advice about your particular legal issues, or if you want to create an attorney-client relationship, you need to retain the Law Offices of Ron A. Stormoen by a signed written retainer agreement.